It is common to think of reputation as assets-things of value that require costly investments to build, that can deteriorate if not maintained attentively. This paper shows that under reputational concerns, the equilibrium outcome of competitive markets may not be Walrasian. In particular, the ability of committing to a specific share, the opportunity of building reputation about inflexibility and the anxiety to preserve their reputation can provide significant market power to the players that are in the long side of the market, even when frictions are negligible. Therefore, the role of reputation is substantial, and so ignoring its presence would be severely misleading.
Introduction
Due to their institutional dissimilarities, not all competitive markets are the same.
However, we-the economic theorists-handle them in the same way and use the Walrasian equilibrium to describe the outcome of a competitive market. Walrasian theory suggests that equilibrium will be achieved through a process of tâtonnement; given the supply and demand, the market will clear itself. Implicit in this conventional mistreatment is the assumption that competitive markets are frictionless, and thus the institutional structure of a competitive market, including the particulars of the trading procedure, has no or little impact on the market outcome. Since the Walrasian theory does not provide any explanation for that matter, it stays an intriguing and open question whether all competitive (or frictionless) markets are indeed Walrasian.
This query has provoked many papers, initiated by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) , providing attractive, non-cooperative foundations for competitive equilibrium. Following the Rubinstein's seminal paper (1982) , some has considered competitive homogeneous goods markets where the price is determined as the perfect equilibrium of a bargaining game between sellers and buyers.
1 Some has investigated the effects of auctions as the trading mechanism. 2 Others have studied the impacts of informational asymmetries under different trading mechanisms. 3 All these researches share a common message: regardless of the trading procedures or informational asymmetries, the market outcome is Walrasian when all frictions vanish.
However, this paper proposes that it may be the market participants' ability to build reputation, not the details of the trading procedures, that may cause non-Walrasian outcomes in competitive markets. To prove this point, I construct a very simple benchmark model resembling a competitive market where the long side-the sellers-has no market power. There are three defining features of the model. First, a single buyer negotiates with two sellers over the sale of one item. Second, the sellers make initial posted-price offers in the Bertrand fashion. The buyer can accept one of these costlessly, or else visit one of the stores and try to bargain for a lower price. 4 Third, each of three players suspects that the opponents might have some kind of irrational commitment forcing them to insist on a specific allocation. 5 That is, the players can be obstinate with small probabilities which affects their negotiating tactics and provides incentives to build reputation on their resoluteness. 6 For analytical clarity, I construct the benchmark model so that it is almost frictionless. Therefore, I assume that the initial priors of each player being obstinate is small but positive and the search cost that the rational buyer incurs at each time he switches his bargaining partner is very small but positive.
The analysis of the benchmark model shows that even in the limit where the frictions vanish, a range of prices that includes the monopoly price and zero are compatible in equilibrium. 7 Therefore, reputational concerns may give the sellers significant market power in a highly competitive market environment. This surprising result is not contradicting with the findings of the existing literature. This is true because the previous literature assumes that market participants are randomly rematched with new partners at each round if an agreement is not reached, and the equilibrium analyses are restricted only to stationary beliefs. That is, players' ability or desire to build reputation has been ignored.
In addition to this notable contribution to the literature initiated by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) , the formalization I propose in this article has four major benefits.
First, the model facilitates the investigation of the roles of strategic commitment and reputation that are elements missing in existing formal models of search and multilateral bargaining. For example, the important finding of bargaining models in search markets is that an outside option plays a limited or no role when the continuation of negotiation is at least as valuable as that of the outside option. The current model, however, makes this prediction invalid by showing that the availability of an endogenous outside option substantially affects the outcome in the bargaining between a buyer and a pair of sellers, 5 Shelling (1960) points out the potential benefits of commitment in strategic and dynamic environments and asserts that one way to model the possibility of commitment is to explicitly include it as an action players can take. Crawford (1982) , Muthoo (1996) and Ellingson and Miettinen (2008) follow this approach and show that commitment can be rationalized in equilibrium if (revoking) it is costly. However, I adopt the approach following Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) where commitments are modeled as behavioral types that exist in the society so that the rational players can mimic if they like to do so. Abreu and Sethi (2003) supports the existence of commitment types from evolutionary perspective and show that if players incur a cost of rationality, even if it is very small, the absence of such behavioral types is not compatible with evolutionary stability in bargaining environments. 6 Obstinate (or commitment) types take an extremely simple form. Parallel to Myerson (1991) , Abreu and Gul (2000) , Kambe (1999) and Atakan and Ekmekci (2009) , a commitment player always demands a particular share and accepts an offer if and only if it weakly exceeds that share. An obstinate seller, for example, always offers his original posted price, and never accepts an offer below that price. Similarly, an obstinate buyer always offers a particular amount, and will never agree to pay more. Thus, a rational player must choose either to mimic an inflexible type, or reveal his rationality and continue negotiation with no uncertainty regarding his actual type. Therefore, reputation of a player is the posterior probability (attached to this player) of being the obstinate type.
7 This is true regardless of the players' time preferences. By vanishing frictions I mean that initial priors and the buyer's search cost converge to zero.
if reputational concerns are present.
Besides, equilibrium analysis shows that sellers have no bargaining power when they fail to coordinate on their initial offers or when the buyer's initial reputation is sufficiently high, i.e. the buyer is strong. For this reason, there is no equilibrium in which rational sellers post different prices, and the unique equilibrium price is zero if the buyer is strong.
The reason behind this finding is simple. First, in equilibrium, the buyer's outside option of leaving a seller is high means that he prefers to walk away from this seller's store rather than to accept the seller's price. Clearly, this is the case when the buyer's reputation is sufficiently more elevated than the sellers' reputation or the other seller posts a lower price. 8 Second, in standard models where obstinate types are nonexistent, a seller can always offer the buyer his continuation value and prevent the buyer leaving him empty- As a result, if the buyer's outside option is sufficiently high, then the buyer's bargaining power becomes substantially strengthened so that the sellers accept any positive share the buyer is about to offer.
However, when the buyer is weak, i.e. his initial reputation is low enough, then reputation has a lock-in effect (see Klemperer, 1987 ) which provides leverage to the sellers so that non-Walrasian prices are sustainable in equilibrium. On the one hand, for the rational buyer, conceding to the first seller is at least as good as visiting the second seller when the buyer is weak and the sellers post the same price. The rational buyer can credibly threaten the first seller to terminate the negotiation only if he maintains enough reputation to make his obstinacy credible against the second seller. But, this is possible if the rational buyer is playing a strategy in which he accepts the seller's price with a positive probability. Therefore, the rational buyer cannot abandon a seller unless he guarantees a positive expected surplus to that seller. On the other hand, price undercutting is never optimal for the sellers. We reach this conclusion in two steps. First, if a seller price undercuts, then he will be perceived as obstinate. Second, as I argued previously, posting different prices will improve the buyer's bargaining power remarkably. As a result, in a competitive environment, being perceived as an obstinate seller reduces the chance that his offer is accepted because the rational buyer prefers to visit the seller, who is very likely to be flexible, first. 9 And, this restrains a rational seller from underbidding his competitor.
In the benchmark model, the rational buyer can costlessly learn and accept the sellers' posted prices. Therefore, price search is indeed costless. However, for analytical convenience, searching for a bargain price is assumed to be costly as the buyer suffers very small but positive switching cost each time he changes his bargaining partner. Regardless of his initial reputation, the rational buyer believes that he can achieve a lower price by haggling with the sellers, and low cost for searching a deal makes haggling more attractive than accepting a seller's posted price. Indeed, the rational buyer strictly prefers to visit sellers if his initial reputation is high, and is indifferent between visiting stores and immediate acceptance of the lowest price if he is weak.
However, when the buyer is weak, then the rational buyer's desire or hope to make a better deal turns into a trap (the lock-in effect of reputation). This trap drags the rational buyer into a situation where he may get much less than what he would achieve if he would have committed himself to accept the lowest posted price. The problem is that the rational buyer cannot commit himself to immediate acceptance because searching for a bargain is equally attractive to him. For this reason, the rational sellers do not have to compete with each other over their posted prices, yielding non-Walrasian outcomes consistent with equilibrium. High search cost clearly makes this trap go away as the rational buyer knows that high cost decreases the attractiveness of searching for a deal.
Arguably, this trap-caused by the buyer's reputational weakness and low search costprobably is the reason for significant markups in some markets, e.g. oriental bazaars,
where there are many stores next to one another, selling (almost) identical products.
The second significant benefit of the formalization is that given the sellers' initial offers, the equilibrium strategies in the multilateral bargaining game is essentially unique.
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This makes the benchmark model a fruitful ground to answer further questions regarding the impacts of reputation on market outcomes and structures. One immediate extension I examine in the paper investigates the effects of reputation in "large markets". The current model presumes that the buyer's moves throughout the haggling process are observable by the sellers. Therefore, the buyer can use his reputation that is built in one store against the other seller. This might be a strong assumption for large markets where the buyers are usually anonymous. For this reason, in Section 6, I relax this condition and suppose that the buyer's arrival time to stores, initial offers and the time he spends in each store are not publicly observable. The simple model in this section shows that anonymity increases the sellers' market power even further.
The third advantage of the formalization is that its predictions are robust in many 10 This finding differs from the standard conclusion in non-cooperative bargaining games that informational asymmetries give rise multiplicities. See, for example, Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) aspects. For instance, in Section 5, I check if the impacts of reputation decrease in "larger" markets where the number of sellers is greater than two, and show that a range of prices including the monopoly price and zero are still consistent with equilibrium. In addition, Section 7 shows that the premises on the obstinate buyer's store selection has no significant effect. That is, even if the obstinate buyer is committed to immediately leave a seller's store once his offer is not accepted, then the lock-in effect of the reputation will still be in play and lead to non-Walrasian equilibrium prices. Finally, in Section 8, I show that reputational concerns of the players overwhelm their behaviors so that equilibrium has a war of attrition structure-each player is indifferent between accepting his opponents' initial demand and waiting for acceptance. As a result, given the sellers' posted prices, the equilibrium of the haggling process is unique and robust in the sense that it is "independent" of the exogenously assumed bargaining protocols (unlike more familiar but relatively less sophisticated models).
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Finally, the benchmark model has potential benefits to market microstructure literature. Although negotiating over prices is common in many markets, it is not clear how a haggling price policy can help a firm gain a strategic advantage or whether it is even sustainable in a competitive market. Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) , Bester (1993) , Wong 12 It is a widely accepted approach in this literature that price posting requires irreversible commitment.
That is, sellers either post price and act absolutely inflexible in their demands or do not post a price but behave completely flexible and bargain with each buyer. However, the current model shows that dedication to such extreme strategies (absolute flexibility or inflexibility) that postulate pure commitment is not optimal in a competitive environment. Very roughly, rational players prefer to randomize (in a sense) these two strategies optimally (see Proposition 3.1).
The Competitive-Bargaining Game in Continuous-Time
Here I define the competitive-bargaining game in continuous-time with multiple commitment types. I then analyze two special cases in Section 3, in which each player has only one commitment type. These special cases both convey the flavor of the analysis and are furthermore the basic building blocks for the multiple type cases studied subsequently.
11 Likewise, Chatterjee and Samuelson (1987) , Samuelson (1992) , Caruana, Eirav and Quint (2007) and Caruana and Einav (2008) show that credible commitment to certain promises, threats or actions would wash out technical specifications of the bargaining procedures.
12 Parallel approaches are extensively used in labor market literature to investigate the wage determination in competitive labor markets. See Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005) and the references therein.
The Players: There are two sellers having an indivisible homogeneous good and a single buyer who wants to consume only one unit. 13 The valuation of the good is one for the buyer and zero for the sellers. Both the buyer and the sellers have some small, positive probability of being a "commitment" type. An obstinate (or commitment) type of player n ∈ {1, 2, b}, where b represents the buyer, 1 and 2 represents the sellers, is identified by a number α n ∈ [0, 1]. A type α i of seller i ∈ {1, 2} always demands α i , accepts any price offer greater or equal to α i and rejects all smaller offers. On the other hand, a type α b of the buyer always demands α b , accepts any price offer smaller or equal to α b and rejects all greater offers. I use the terms rational (flexible) or obstinate (inflexible) with the identity of a player (buyer or seller) whenever I want to differentiate the types of the player. Not mentioning these terms with the identity of a player should be understood that I mean both rational and obstinate types of that player.
I denote by C ⊂ [0, 1) with 0 ∈ C the finite set of obstinate types for all three players
and by π(α n ) the conditional probability that player n is obstinate of type α n given that he is obstinate.
14 Hence, π is a probability distribution on C and, without loss of generality, is common for all three players. 15 I assume that π(α) > 0 for all α ∈ C. In case I need to emphasize different obstinate types of player n, I use α n , α n and so on.
The initial probability that n is obstinate (i.e. player n's initial reputation) is denoted by z n . I restrict my attention to the case where the sellers' initial reputations are the same (that is z i = z s for i = 1, 2) and that z b and z s take sufficiently small values.
As it is briefly discussed in Section 7, the essence of our results in Sections 4 and 5
do not change even when z 1 = z 2 . Therefore, the restriction z i = z s for i = 1, 2 has no critical role in reaching our results. Though, characterization of equilibrium prices when z b and z s take large values may be an interesting exercise per se, the main point of this study is to show that many non-Walrasian prices are consistent with equilibrium even when frictions are negligibly small (i.e. z b ≈ 0 and z s ≈ 0). Moreover, large values of z b and z s do not turn the results in the following sections upside down, but produce additional cases and lengthier proofs that have no significant insight. For this reason, I
13 In Section 5, I consider the case where the number of sellers is some N > 2. I take the short side of the market as the demand side. The unique buyer assumption is consistent with markets where the buyer has some monopsony power, or each seller has a large number of goods to sell (so no competition between the buyers) and the buyers cannot convey information to one another (no interaction between the buyers). On the other hand, In Sections 4 and 5 I show that non-Walrasian prices can be supported in equilibrium even though the buyer has monopsony power. In this respect, having more than one buyer can only strengthen the findings of these sections.
14 Having 1 / ∈ C does not affect the analyses and the results of the paper but eliminates additional cases that produce nothing new. 15 Since the sellers are restricted to play pure strategies in stage 1, assuming different priors, π i , for the sellers has no impact as long as π i 's have full support over C. More formally, given seller i's strategy, the posterior belief that i is a commitment type is either 1 (in case i deviates from his strategy) or z s (otherwise) regardless of π i .
limit the analyses for small values of z b and z s . 16 Finally, I denote by r b and r s the rate of time preferences of the rational buyer and the sellers, respectively.
The Timing of the Game: The competitive-bargaining game between the sellers and the buyer is a two-stage, infinite horizon, continuous-time game. The sellers make initial posted-price offers; the buyer can accept one of these costlessly (over the phone, say), or else visit one of the stores and try to bargain for a lower price. The buyer can negotiate only with the seller whom he is currently visiting. The buyer is free to walk out of one store and try the other, but at a cost (delay) of switching which is assumed to be very small. The reader may wish to picture this market as an environment where the sellers' stores are located at opposite ends of a town, and so changing the bargaining partner is costly for the buyer because it takes time to move from one store to the other and the buyer discounts time.
More formally, stage 1 starts and ends at time zero and the timing within the first stage is as follows. Initially, each seller simultaneously announces (posts) a demand (price) from the set C and it is observable by the buyer. 17 After observing the sellers' demands, the buyer has two options. He can accept one of the posted prices and finish the game. Or, he can make a counter offer that is observable by the sellers and visit one of the sellers to start the second stage (the bargaining phase).
Note that if seller i is rational and posting the price of α i ∈ C in stage 1, then this is his strategic choice. If he is the obstinate type, then he merely declares the demand corresponding to his type. Given the description of the obstinate players, if the buyer accepts α i and finishes the game at time zero, then he is either rational and finishing the game strategically or obstinate of type α b such that α b ≥ α i . Likewise, if the buyer makes a counter offer α b ∈ C which is incompatible with the sellers' demands, i.e., α b < min{α 1 , α 2 }, then this may be because the buyer is rational and strategically demanding this price or because the buyer is the obstinate type α b .
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Upon the beginning of the second stage (at time zero) the buyer and seller i, who is visited by the buyer first, immediately begin to play the following concession game:
At any given time, a player either accepts his opponent's initial demand or waits for a concession. At the same time, the buyer decides whether to stay or leave store i. If the buyer leaves store i and goes to store j ∈ {1, 2} with j = i, the buyer and seller j start 16 Although some proofs will utilize smaller upper bounds for these priors, the assumption z b , z s < α for all α ∈ C \ {0} is sufficient for most of the results in the paper. 17 For analytical simplicity, I assume that the set of offers is common for all the players and is equal to the set of obstinate types C. This restriction is dispensable and can be removed with no impact on equilibrium outcomes. 18 Therefore, if the buyer makes a counter offer and demands α b that is greater than or equal to the minimum of the posted prices, then the buyer is rational and strategically demanding this price.
playing the concession game upon the buyer's arrival at that store. 19 Assuming that the sellers are spatially separated, let δ denote the discount factor for the buyer that occurs due to the time, ∆ > 0, required to travel from one store to the other. That is, δ = e −r b ∆ .
Note that δ (the search friction) is the cost that the buyer incurs at each time he switches his bargaining partner. 20 I assume that the search friction is very small, and thus δ is very close to one, i.e. δ ≈ 1. 21 Concession of the buyer or seller i, while the buyer is in store i, marks the completion of the game; if the agreement α ∈ {α b , α i } is reached at time t, then the payoffs to seller i, the buyer and seller j are αe −rst , (1 − α)e −r b t and 0, respectively. In case of simultaneous concession, surplus is split equally. show that under some restrictions, the second stage equilibrium outcomes of the competitive-bargaining game in discrete-time converge to a unique limit, independent of the exogenously given bargaining protocols, as time between offers converge to zero, and this limit is equivalent to the unique outcome of the second stage of the game G.
The Information Structure: There is no informational asymmetry regarding the players' valuations and time preferences. Moreover, all three players' initial offers, the buyer's timing and store selection are observable by the public. 23 However, players have private information about their resoluteness. That is, each player knows its own type but does not know the opponents' true types. 19 After leaving store i and traveling part way to store j, the buyer could, if he wished, turn back and enter store i again. However, the buyer will never behave that way in equilibrium. 20 One may assume a switching cost for the buyer that is independent of the "travel time" ∆, but this change would not affect our results. However, incorporating the search friction in this manner simplifies the notation substantially. 21 More specifically, I assume that for all α, α ∈ C with α > α we have (1 − α) < δ(1 − α ). The idea behind this assumption is very simple; the search friction should not prevent the rational buyer to walk away from a store if he knows that the other seller has posted a lower price. At the end of this section I elaborate on this assumption in more detail. 22 This particular assumption is not crucial because simultaneous concession occurs with probability zero in equilibrium. 23 When stakes are high, the negotiation becomes (to some degree) public mainly because the bargainers' incentive to scrutinize their opponents' moves throughout the negotiation process is higher. YouTubes flirt with Google and Yahoo before Google has acquired YouTube for $1.65 billion and Yahoos negotiation with Microsoft and AOL Time Warner are just two examples on this account. Therefore, I consider an extreme case where the buyer's actions (demands) are perfectly observable. Clearly, in some circumstances, e.g. in large markets where traders are rather anonymous, the sellers may not be able to attain all the information nor can the buyer convey it perfectly. For this reason, in Section 6, I consider the other extreme case where the buyer's arrival to the market and moves in negotiating with a seller is unobservable by the public. The simple model in that section shows that anonymity increases sellers' market power further.
More Details on Obstinate Types: Strategies of an obstinate player is simple; never back down from the initial offer. Although the remaining assumptions are dispensable, I give them for the sake of completeness. I assume that the obstinate buyer of any type (or demand) α b ∈ C understands the equilibrium and leaves his bargaining partner permanently when he is convinced that his partner will never concede. is the probability that the rational buyer announces the demand α b ∈ C with α b ≤ α where α = min{α 1 , α 2 }. That is, µ is a probability measure over C α = {x ∈ C|x ≤ α}.
I require that the game G ends in stage 1 when the rational buyer announces α. That is, immediate concession of the buyer is represented by the buyer's announcement of α.
Moreover, σ i denotes the probability of the rational buyer visiting seller i first, and so
If the competitive-bargaining game proceeds to stage 2 and the first stage strategies of the players are (α i , σ i ) i and µ, then the Bayes' rule implies the followings: The probability of seller i being obstinate conditional on posting price α i is z s if α i = α i and 1 otherwise. Likewise, the probability that the buyer is the commitment type conditional on announcing his demand as α b < α and visiting seller i first is Player n's reputationẑ n is a function of histories and n's strategies, representing the probability that the other players attach to the event that n is obstinate. It is updated according to the Bayes' rule. At the beginning of the game we haveẑ b (∅) = z b and z i (∅) = z s for each seller i, where ∅ represents the null history. Given the rational buyer's first stage strategies and a history h 0 where the buyer announces α b and visits seller i first, the buyer's reputation at the time he enters store i, i.e.ẑ b (h 0 ), is given by Equation (1) . Following the history h 0 , if the buyer plays the concession game with seller i until some time t > 0, and the game has not ended yet (call this history h t ), then the buyer's reputation at time t isẑ
, assuming that the buyer's strategy in the concession game is F i,0 b . Note from the last arguments that the buyer's reputation at time t reaches 1 when
. This is the case because F i,0 b (t) is the sellers' belief about the buyer's play during the concession game with seller i. That is, it is the strategy of the buyer from the point of view of the sellers. More generally, the upper limit of the 25 Given the sellers' announcements α 1 and α 2 , the obstinate buyer of type α b ≥ α = min{α 1 , α 2 } accepts the seller's price α and finalizes the game. Therefore, conditional on the buyer visiting seller i first and demanding some α b < α, the probability that the buyer is obstinate of type α b should be
2 z b is the probability that the buyer is obstinate and he visits seller i first. 26 That is, there exits > 0 such that for all t 
with
. In a similar manner, given F T i , the expected payoff of the rational buyer who concedes to seller i at time t is
where
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Further Discussions: A buyer and a seller negotiate over the surplus of size 1 is a standard opening sentence of bargaining models in the literature, and this formalization is regarded as the canonical version of actual negotiation problems. This systematization is originated from the assumptions that the negotiators are risk-neutral, buyer's valuation of the good is v > 0, and the seller's reservation price is some 0 < c, with c < v.
Many scholars assume that the set of possible bargaining agreements (PBA in short) is a compact subset of R, i.e. [c, v] . Therefore, the unit surplus is just the normalization of the interval of PBA for the risk-neutral negotiators.
If one takes the compactness of the set PBA literal, it follows that the negotiators are allowed to offer any rational (even irrational) numbers within the range of PBA. The technical plausibility of this assumption is undeniable; it is very convenient to work with compact and convex set of strategies. However, its applicability is not quite obvious.
Suppose, for instance, Alice is planning to sell her house at a price no less than $500,000 and Bob is willing to pay at most $600,000 for Alice's house. In an actual negotiation between Alice and Bob, the offers and concessions most likely, at the best, be multiples of $1,000. Either Bob or Alice would perceive concessions less than, for instance, $100 peculiar and frivolous. Even if Bob and Alice feel that they are not restricted by the "social norms" of negotiations and are willing to make concessions as small as possible, they cannot make concessions less than a cent. Even if they wish to make concessions less than a cent, they cannot implement a price that is not a multiple of one cent, as it is the smallest unit of U.S. dollar.
Then, the question begs an explanation; if some prices are simply not feasible, why do we assume an infinite and compact set of PBA? As mentioned earlier, this is just a practical simplification, and mostly innocuous. However, in cases where this assumption is technically problematic, as in the case of my construct, its use should not be considered as indispensable. Now I shall discuss why it is puzzling to use an infinite, compact set of commitment types in the competitive bargaining game G. Suppose for now that the set of commitment types C is equal to the unit interval [0, 1], and so π is a continuous distribution (density) function over C. Then, given rational seller i's equilibrium strategy for the first stage (posting α i ∈ C), the posterior probability that i is the obstinate type is simply zero if seller i actually posts the price of α i . This is true because the probability that i is obstinate is z s whereas the conditional probability that seller i is obstinate of type α i ,
This situation is also valid in other models that allow multiple obstinate types. Abreu and Gul (2000) handled this problem by considering a finite set of obstinate types. Kambe For example, Kreps and Wilson (1982) argue that monopolists may be strong or weak and that they wish to develop reputations for strength in order to convince new firms not to enter the market. Similarly, Schelling (1966) suggests that states may be resolute or irresolute and they wish to acquire reputations for resolve in order to increase their credibility in international disputes.
Hence, I restrict my attention to any finite set C which is a subset of [0, 1) with 0 ∈ C.
Although I prove all the results with no further restriction on C, one may consider it as the normalized version of the set of all feasible prices between the reservation prices of the sellers, c, and the buyer v. That is, C = 0,
where 100
indicates one dollar. Therefore, if C represents the set of all feasible bargaining agreements between the buyer and the sellers, it shall not be treated as an ad-hoc restriction nor as a peculiar friction.
Finally, I would like to discuss the assumption on the search friction δ, which is assumed to be very close to 1, and thus satisfing (1 − α) < δ(1 − α ) for all α, α ∈ C with α > α . In this paper, I aim to investigate the impacts of reputation in (almost) frictionless competitive markets. Hence, the motivation of the current formalization and the assumptions is to create an environment which resembles such markets. This is the reason why I ignore large search friction, i.e. smaller δ's. One alternative would be eliminating the search friction entirely. However, I use this arbitrarily small but positive friction to eliminate impractical indifferences that would occur during concession games when the sellers post the same prices.
This inequality follows from the dynamics of the rational buyer's haggling activities.
Suppose that the buyer is in store 1 and playing the concession game with seller 1 whose posted price is α. If the buyer concedes to seller 1, the buyer's instantaneous payoff will be 1 − α. However, if the buyer (immediately) leaves 1 and goes directly to the second seller to accept his posted price α (where α < α), his discounted payoff will be δ(1 − α ).
Hence, the inequality (1 − α) < δ(1 − α ) basically implies that the search friction should not prevent the rational buyer to walk away from a store if he knows that the other seller has posted a lower price.
In some markets, search friction may shape the market participants' behavior significantly. However, there are many examples where search cost is negligible. For example, a growing number of global e-commerce platforms, such as alibaba.com, importers.com, makes it easier for millions of buyers and suppliers around the world to do trade online.
If the buyer is, for example, a small sized enterprise that is planning to buy electronic chips from the producers located in Hong Kong and Kuala Lumpur, then it is most likely that the offers and concessions between the parties will be exchanged via e-mail, fax or phone.
Nevertheless, one may criticize the applicability of this inequality by arguing that in an actual market place, if two sellers' prices are just a cent apart from one another, then the buyer may prefer to accept the high price instead of switching his partner to gain an additional cent. In order to take this as an evidence for high search cost (or the violation of the inequality), one has to take the assumption on players' preferences literal; a player's payoff is a strictly increasing function of the surplus he receives. However, this is just a practical simplification of the main assumption that the players prefer more to less.
Likewise, we should consider this inequality as a convenient simplification of the main focus of the model; the market is almost frictionless, and so cost of searching a bargain is negligibly small. Last but not least, Ozyurt (2012) shows that even when the set of obstinate types C is assumed to equal to the whole unit interval, then the Walrasian price of zero, is not a robust outcome if reputational concerns are valid. Thus, the assumptions on the finiteness of C and the size of δ are not essential to show that players' reputational concerns may lead to non-Walrasian prices in competitive markets.
Single Commitment Types
I now turn to the analysis of equilibrium in case each player has only one commitment type. Therefore, the set of obstinate types, C n , is singleton and possibly different for each player n. In particular, for the rest of this section, I assume that seller i's obstinate type 
During the concession game, the rational buyer and seller concede by choosing the timing of acceptance randomly with constant hazard (or instantaneous acceptance) rates
, respectively. They play the concession game until T e , when both players' reputations simultaneously reach 1. Since rational player n is indifferent between conceding and waiting at all times, his expected payoff during the concession game v n is equal to what he can achieve at time 0. Therefore, by Equations (2) and (3) we have
Note that 1 − c n indicates the probability of player n's initial concession (or player n's initial probabilistic concession), and the second condition in (4) implies that only one player can make concession at time zero. Abreu and Gul (2000) call a player strong if his opponent makes an initial probabilistic concession at time zero and weak otherwise.
Therefore, if the rational buyer (or the seller) is weak, then his expected payoff is 1 − α s (or α b ).
A. Symmetric Obstinate types for the Sellers
Now, I resume the case with two sellers. In this subsection, I assume that the sellers' obstinate types are identical, that is α i = α s for i = 1, 2. The equilibrium of the competitive-bargaining game is virtually unique. 28 The three conditions provided in (4) will not characterize the equilibrium strategies of the competitive-bargaining game G, as the game gets complicated with the existence of outside option for the buyer. However,
Arguments parallel to Hendricks, Weiss and Wilson (1988) and Lemma 1 of Abreu and
Gul (2000) ensures that the equilibrium strategies in the concession games between the buyer and each seller i will partially satisfy these three conditions.
A short descriptive summary of the equilibrium strategies is as follows. In stage 1, sellers post α s and the buyer makes counter offer of α b and visits seller i with a positive probability σ i . In stage 2 (see Figure 1 ), the buyer visits each store at most once. He enters, for example, store 1 at time zero. His reputation at this time isẑ
. If the buyer's reputation,ẑ 1 b is high enough (relative to z s ), then the rational buyer makes a take it or leave it offer to seller 1. That is, he leaves store 1 immediately following his arrival at that store. Then, he goes directly to store 2 and plays the concession game with the second seller. However, for small values ofẑ second store. In equilibrium, the rational buyer leaves the first store when his discounted expected payoff in the second store is at least as high as his continuation payoff in the first store. Therefore, in equilibrium, ifẑ 1 b is low relative to z s , the rational buyer needs to build up his reputation before leaving the first store.
During the concession game, the rational buyer and seller 1 concede by choosing the timing of acceptance randomly with constant hazard rates that are given in the previous subsection, i.e. λ b and λ s respectively. Seller 1's concession game strategy F 1 (t) satisfies all three conditions of (4), but the buyer's strategy F 
. The last term is less than one because it provides enough incentive to the buyer to walk away from the first store and to search a deal in the second.
Once the buyer arrives at store 2, the buyer and seller 2 play the concession game until T e 2 , the time that both players' reputations simultaneously reach 1. For notational simplicity, I manipulate the subsequent notation and reset the clock once the buyer arrives in store 2 (but not the players' reputations). Thus, I define each player's distribution function as if the concession game in each store starts at time zero. In the second store, the rational buyer and seller 2 concede with constant hazard rates λ b and λ s respectively.
The concession game strategies of the buyer and seller 2, F 2 b and F 2 respectively, satisfy all three conditions in (4) with one important adjustment; we have
] because the buyer's reputation at the time he arrives at store 2 is different (higher) than his reputation once he enters store 1.
29 That is, F 1 (t) = 1−c 1 e −λst and
Proposition 3.1. In any (sequential) equilibrium of the competitive-bargaining game G, the rational buyer visits each store at most once. Moreover, the rational buyer leaves the first store at some finite time for sure, given that the game does not end before, and directly goes to the other store if and only if the first seller is obstinate. Finally, in an equilibrium where the rational buyer visits seller 1 first with probability σ 1 , leaves store 1 at time T d 1 and finalizes the game in store 2 at time T e 2 if the game has not yet ended before, the players' concession game strategies must be
I defer the proofs of all the results in this section to Appendix. In equilibrium, the rational buyer's continuation payoff is no more than 1 − α s if he reveals his rationality.
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Since the obstinate buyer leaves a seller when he is convinced that his bargaining partner is also inflexible, leaving the first seller "earlier" (or "later") than this time would reveal the buyer's rationality. Moreover, since the cost of switching stores is positive, the rational buyer never leaves a seller if there is a positive probability that the seller is flexible, and he immediately leaves otherwise. Clearly the buyer does not revisit a seller once he knows that this seller is obstinate.
Next, I will characterize the buyer's departure time from the first store, T d 1 , the time that the competitive-bargaining game ends in store 2, T e 2 , the rational buyer's initial probabilistic concession in the first store, F 1 b (0), and the rational buyer's store selection at time zero, σ 1 . The rational players' equilibrium payoffs in the concession games are calculated by the equations of (5). That is, for each seller i
However, the rational players' equilibrium payoffs in the game G is different as they should take into account the buyer's outside option and store selection in stage 1. I will provide the rational buyer's payoffs because they are important for the analyses in the subsequent sections.
31 30 Arguments similar to the proof of Lemma 2 in the Online Appendix and the one-sided uncertainty result of Myerson (1991, Theorem 8.4 ) imply this result. 31 The sellers' expected payoff calculations are more involved, and hence presented in the appendix.
In equilibrium where the buyer first visits seller 1, the rational buyer leaves the first seller when he is convinced that this seller is obstinate. At this moment, walking out of store 1 is optimal for the rational buyer if his discounted continuation payoff in the second store, δv 2 b , is no less than 1 − α s , payoff to the rational buyer if he concedes to the obstinate seller 1. Let z * b denote the level of reputation required to provide the rational buyer enough incentive to leave the first store. Assuming thatẑ 1 b < z * b (i.e., the rational buyer needs to build up his reputation before walking out of store 1), the game ends in store 2 at time T
32 Thus, given the value of F 2 (0) and the rational buyer's discounted continuation payoff in store 2, z * b must solve
. Note that z * b is well-defined, i.e. z * b ∈ (0, 1), as A is positive. In fact, A is very close to 1 since the cost of traveling is assumed to be very small.
On the other hand, whenẑ
, the rational buyer's discounted continuation payoff in store 2 is higher than 1 − α s at the beginning of the second stage. Therefore, the rational buyer prefers going to store 2 and playing the concession game with this seller over conceding to seller 1. In equilibrium, rational seller 1 anticipates that the buyer will never concede to him but rather plans to leave his store immediately, and so he accepts the buyer's demand at time zero without any delay.
Lemma 3.1. In equilibrium where the rational buyer visits seller 1 first with probability
λ b /λs holds, the rational buyer makes a take it or leave it offer to the seller and goes directly to store 2. Rational seller 1 immediately accepts the buyer's demand and finishes the game at time zero with probability one. In case seller 1 does not concede to the buyer, the buyer infers that seller 1 is obstinate, and so he never comes back to this store again. The concession game with the second seller may continue until the time T 
Lemma 3.2. In equilibrium where the rational buyer visits seller 1 first with probability 
In equilibrium,ẑ In this particular case, the rational buyer's equilibrium payoff of visiting seller 1 first is
I call the buyer strong if the first seller he visits makes an initial probabilistic concession and weak otherwise. 33 Similarly, seller i is called strong if the rational buyer concedes to him with a positive probability at the time he visits store i first at time zero, and weak otherwise.
The last three Lemmas show that the rational buyer's expected payoff of visiting seller i first increases withẑ i b (See Equations (7) and (8)). As a result, if the buyer's initial reputation z b is high, then in equilibrium the rational buyer must visit each seller with equal probabilities so thatẑ λ b /λs . And third, the rational buyer's expected payoff in the game G is 1 − α s if he is weak and strictly higher than 1 − α s otherwise.
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Proposition 3.2. In equilibrium, the rational buyer visits seller 1 first with probability
whenever the buyer is strong, i.e.
s /A) λ b /λs . The last result in this section shows that extreme greediness makes the buyer weak independent of his initial reputation z b . Proposition 3.3. Suppose now that α b = 0 < α s . In equilibrium, the rational buyer visits seller i first with probability σ i ∈ (0, 1) and accepts α s immediately following his arrival at store i. The rational sellers never concede to the buyer. Hence, equilibrium payoff of the buyer is 1 − α s .
Proof. Clearly, these strategies form an equilibrium. Next, suppose for a contradiction that there is some other equilibrium where the sellers concede to the buyer at some time t > 0. First, conceding to the buyer gives instantaneous payoff of zero to the sellers and waiting is definitely optimal if the sellers believe that the buyer is rational with some positive probability. Therefore, in any equilibrium, a seller concedes to the buyer at time t if (a) he is convinced by this time that the buyer is obstinate or (b) that the buyer is leaving his store once and for all. The buyer's reputation reaches one at time t if and only if the rational buyer makes concession with probability one before or at time t. However, according to Lemma A.1(in the appendix) if the seller is not making a concession until time t, then in equilibrium, the rational buyer does not make concession until time t either. On the other hand, the second case, i.e. (b), contradicts with sequential rationality because the rational buyer's continuation payoff of leaving a seller and not returning is (1 − α s )/δ.
B. Asymmetric Obstinate Types for the Sellers
This section characterizes the unique equilibrium strategy of the competitive-bargaining game G when the sellers' commitment types are different. Without loss of generality, I assume that α 1 > α 2 > α b . In this case, the structure of the equilibrium strategy drastically changes (relating to the case where α 1 = α 2 ). In equilibrium, the bargaining phase never ends with the buyer's concession to the seller who has the higher demand (seller 1). If the buyer ever visits store 1, the rational seller 1 concedes to the buyer (upon the buyer's arrival at this seller) because the buyer has the tendency to opt out instantly from the concession game in store 1.
More formally, consider the case where the buyer is in store 1 and playing the concession game with this seller. This means that the rational buyer should be indifferent between, on the one hand, accepting seller 1's demand, thus receiving the instantaneous payoff of 1 − α 1 , and on the other hand, waiting for the concession of the seller. However, if the rational buyer leaves (immediately) seller 1 and goes directly to the second store to accept the demand of seller 2, his discounted payoff will be δ(1−α 2 ). Thus, if the rational buyer ever visits store 1 in equilibrium, then he will never accept seller 1's demand. This is because we have (1 − α 1 ) < δ(1 − α 2 ) by the assumption that the search friction is very small. Therefore, in equilibrium, the rational buyer does not concede to nor spend time with seller 1 given that he ever visits store 1. As a result, it must be the case that rational seller 1 instantaneously accepts the buyer's demand with probability one upon his arrival, and the buyer immediately leaves store 1 if seller 1 does not concede to him.
Since the buyer plays an equilibrium strategy that impels rational seller 1 to reveal his type immediately, the rational buyer's expected payoff of visiting this seller is (1 − 
This inequality holds when z s ≥z holds, wherez is very close to one as δ is close to one. 35 However, assuming that initial priors are small enough, we have z s <z, implying that if the buyer visits seller 2 first in equilibrium, then the rational buyer strictly prefers leaving this seller immediately upon his arrival. Hence, rational seller 2 must concede to the buyer at time 0 with probability one. The next result characterizes the second-stage equilibrium strategies of the competitive-bargaining game G. for all t ≥ 0.
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(ii) if the buyer visits seller 2 first, then rational seller 2 immediately accepts the buyer's demand upon his arrival. Otherwise, the buyer leaves seller 2 immediately at time zero (knowing that seller 2 is the obstinate type), and goes directly to seller 1.
Rational seller 1 instantly accepts the buyer's demand with probability one upon the buyer's arrival. In case seller 1 does not concede, the rational buyer immediately leaves this seller, directly returns to seller 2, accepts the seller's demand α 2 and finalizes the game.
Therefore, in equilibrium, when the buyer visits seller 1 first, he sends a take it or leave it ultimatum to this seller. If seller 1 does not accept the buyer's demand, then the buyer will go to the second seller. In this case, an agreement might be reached with seller 2, but possibly after some delay. On the other hand, when the buyer visits seller 2 first, he sends the same ultimatum to both sellers (first to seller 2 and then to 1). If no seller accepts the buyer's demand, then the rational buyer will come back to seller 2 and accept his demand α 2 . 37 Hence, the rational buyer visits seller 1 first only when he is strong relative to seller 2 (i.e.,ẑ 1 b is sufficiently higher than z s ) so that the initial probabilistic concession he will receive from seller 2 is high enough. This implies that in equilibrium, the rational buyer will visit seller 1 first with a very low probability. The following result summarizes the last argument formally. Proposition 3.5. In the unique equilibrium of the competitive-bargaining game G, the rational buyer visits seller 1 first with a very small probability. That is, σ 1 =
36 Note that for notational simplicity, I reset the clock once the buyer enters store 2. 37 Rational seller 2's immediate concession to the buyer (and receiving the payoff of α b ) is optimal because otherwise the rational seller can achieve at most α 2 z s (since the buyer revisits seller 2 only if seller 1 is the obstinate type) and we have α 2 z s < α b by assumption.
Thus if the obstinate types are such that 0 < α b < α 2 < α 1 , then the equilibrium payoff of the rational buyer is
The final result in this section investigates the equilibrium when the buyer is extremely greedy, i.e. α b = 0.
Proposition 3.6. Suppose now that 0 = α b < α 2 < α 1 . In equilibrium of the competitivebargaining game G, the payoff to the rational buyer is 1−α 2 , and the payoff to the rational seller 1 is 0.
Proof. It is clear that the buyer will never concede to seller 1 as (1 − α 1 ) is less than the discounted payoff he can achieve by accepting the second seller's demand. Hence, in any equilibrium, the payoff of the first seller must be 0. Moreover, in equilibrium, the rational buyer must choose σ i ∈ (0, 1), implying that he must be indifferent between the sellers to visit first. However, the rational seller 2 will never accept the buyer's demand in equilibrium. This is because the rational buyer will come back to second store for sure to accept his demand once he realizes that seller 1 is obstinate, implying positive expected payoff for the rational seller 2. Hence, the highest expected payoff the rational buyer can attain in the second store is 1 − α 2 , i.e. immediate concession to the second seller. Hence, the rational buyer's expected payoff in the game must be 1 − α 2 .
Multiple Commitment Types
In Remark that 0 ∈ C is always an equilibrium demand selection of the sellers in the first stage of the competitive-bargaining game. Moreover, in equilibrium, the rational sellers will accept the buyer's demand of α b > 0 if they certainly believe that the buyer is obstinate. However, if α b = 0, then the sellers are indifferent between conceding and not conceding. Therefore, I break the sellers' indifference in favor of the buyer and assume that the rational sellers will accept the buyer's demand of 0 if they certainly believe that the buyer is obstinate. Since there is no claim on the uniqueness of equilibrium prices, restricting attention to particular equilibria that deliver the main point does not lead to any loss. However, one may eliminate this requirement by assuming 0 / ∈ C, and so the lowest value of the set C (call it α min ) is positive. This will not alter the main results of the paper, but assuming α min = 0 eliminates many technical details that has to be tackled in the proofs.
Furthermore, in equilibrium, the rational buyer will demand 0 and visit each store first with some positive probability, that is µ(0) > 0 and σ i ∈ (0, 1) for each seller i.
These are true, independent of the sellers' posted prices or initial reputations, because otherwise the buyer would benefit from deviating to be perceived as obstinate. 
by Equation (9), which is clearly higher than 1 − α 2 . Hence, the rational buyer prefers posting α b over 0, contradicting the fact that in equilibrium the buyer must announce zero with some positive probability.
Since the sellers are ex-ante identical, it is natural to suspect that in equilibrium both sellers should choose the same demand. The following two results characterizes the equilibrium payoff of a rational seller who price undercuts his opponent.
Proposition 4.2.
Consider a history at which sellers post the prices α 1 and α 2 with α 1 > α 2 , seller 2 is known to be obstinate whereas the true types of seller 1 and the buyer are unknown. Then the unique sequential equilibrium of the continuation game followed by this history is as follows.
(i) If α 2 > 0, then the rational buyer announces his demand as 0 and visits seller 1 first (with probability one) to make the take it or leave it offer; he leaves store 1 upon his arrival at that store. Conditional on not reaching a deal, the rational buyer goes directly to seller 2 and accepts α 2 . On the other hand, rational seller 1 immediately accepts the buyer's demand.
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(ii) If α 2 = 0, then the buyer immediately accepts the second seller's posted demand and finishes the game in the first stage.
Proof. Consider a history and the strategies prescribed above. It is straightforward to show that they constitute an equilibrium. To show that there is no other equilibrium, recall that 1 − α 1 < δ(1 − α 2 ) because the search friction is assumed to be sufficiently small. Therefore, it is optimal for the rational buyer to go to store 2 and to accept α 2 instead of accepting α 1 . Moreover, regardless of the buyer's announcement α b , postponing concession is not optimal for rational seller 1 since the buyer will never accept α 1 in equilibrium. Thus, rational seller 1 accepts the buyer's demand upon his arrival at store 1, and the rational buyer will choose α b = 0 in equilibrium. The remaining parts of the equilibrium strategies immediately follow for small values of z b and z s .
Therefore, if seller 2 deviates from his strategy and price undercuts his opponent, then the buyer infers that seller 2 is obstinate with certainty (as sellers are playing pure strategies in the first stage). Being perceived as an obstinate seller reduces the chance that his offer is accepted by the buyer. This is true because the rational buyer prefers to use the obstinate seller's low price as an "outside option" to increase his bargaining power against seller 1 whom he can negotiate and possibly get a much better deal. As a result of this, deviating from an equilibrium price leads to a very low expected payoff for a rational seller as the following result indicates. I defer the proof to Appendix. Given that both sellers choose the same demand α s that is higher than 0, the rational buyer's strategy choosing each seller with equal probabilities and declaring a demand α b < α s according to µ
(together with the second stage strategies as characterized in Section 3) are equilibrium strategies for the buyer when he is weak at all demands in the support of µ * . Under these strategies, the equilibrium payoff of a rational seller is greater than 
The Limiting Case of Complete Rationality
This section characterizes the set of equilibrium prices when the frictions vanish. relative to z m s so that K < 1/N , and thus prices arbitrarily close to 1 can be supported in equilibrium with vanishing frictions.
The Buyer's Moves are Unobservable by the Public
Next, I investigate the case where the buyer's moves and demand announcements are not public. I will show that the sellers' market power will increase further in this case. For this reason, I make three modifications on the competitive bargaining game G. First, the rational buyer announces his demand at the sellers' stores and he can offer different demands in each store. 39 Second, the buyer's moves including his arrival to the market are unknown by the public. That is, sellers can observe the buyer only when he visits their stores. Third, related to the previous one, the buyer arrives at the market according to a Poisson arrival process. Given that the rational buyer plays a strategy in which he visits both sellers with positive probabilities upon his arrival at the market, the last assumption ensures that sellers cannot learn the buyer's actual type and if they are the first or the second store visited by the buyer. According to these strategies, the rational buyer will visit only one seller. Moreover, due to the Poisson arrival process and Bayes' rule, the sellers will believe very highly that the buyer is rational conditional on his arrival at their stores. In particular,ẑ
is independent of i and it equals to either z b or a number very close to z b . In other words, sellers will learn nothing about the buyer's actual type upon his arrival at their stores because the sellers' prior belief will stay (almost) the same for the entire arrival process. 41 Given that the buyer arrives at the market at time T , the concession game which is very close to z b . 40 In the modified game, the rational players' strategies, that may depend on time T indicating the buyer's arrival time, are equivalent to the strategies defined in Section 2 with one exception. Now, µ Note that a demand α s ∈ C satisfying the inequality provided in Proposition 5.2. also satisfies the inequality provided in Corollary 6.1, but the converse is not true. Thus, if the buyer's moves are unobservable by the public, then the sellers' market powers increase as higher prices can be supported in equilibrium.
Some Extensions Obstinate Players
An obstinate player is a man of unyielding perseverance. Sellers may manifest such a steadfast attitude because they might be confined to do so. A company may be inflexible in a wage negotiation due to some regulations within the company. For example, a car dealer, a sales clerk or a realtor may be restricted by the owner regarding how flexible he can be in his demands while negotiating with a buyer. A fresh college graduate who is competing with other candidates for a specific job opening may commit to a certain salary because he wants to pay his student loan without too much financial difficulty.
Steady persistence in adhering to a course of action as assumed for an obstinate (type) buyer would be reasonable when, for example, the "buyer" is looking to advance his position. A worker (negotiating with more than one firm) may accept the new job offer if it provides a significant jump in his salary or title relative to the position he is already holding. On the other hand, a successful investor (a venture capitalist) whose portfolio have assets having high profit margins may commit to buy a small business only if it is a real bargain because otherwise it may not be worth including it in his portfolio.
An entrepreneur who is running a successful small business may commit to his initial demands while negotiating with investors to sell his business or a franchise because of his overly optimistic expectations about the future of his business.
To justify the current assumptions on the obstinate buyer, one may suppose that the obstinate buyer is a player that is the "least strategic" or naive in terms of store choice and timing of departure, or a man who "plays it cool." Alternatively, one may assume that the obstinate buyer (1) does not discount time and (2) The assumption on the obstinate buyer's departure habit seems a strong one since it eliminates the possibility that the rational buyer would increase his bargaining power by committing to a particular pattern of store choice. For example, consider the case where the obstinate buyer is "more strategic." That is, he commits himself to immediately switch to another seller if the first seller does not concede right away. In some situations, it will increase the rational buyers payoff. However, as the following two results show, it 42 Therefore, according to (1), the time of an agreement is not a concern for the obstinate buyer, and thus he does not feel the need to distinguish himself from the rational buyer who wishes to reach an agreement as quickly as possible. Since the obstinate buyer does not discount time, b is the only search friction that the obstinate buyer is subject to and it would have no impact on our analysis -the switching cost b would work as a tie-breaking device. Moreover, the assumption "the obstinate buyer understands the equilibrium and leaves his bargaining partner when he is convinced that his partner is also obstinate" can be interpreted as an implication rather than an assumption. Since the obstinate buyer does not value time, he should be indifferent between staying with his current partner or visiting the other seller at any time (ignoring the switching cost). However, if he leaves his current partner before being convinced that he is obstinate, he will revisit this seller later if he exhausts all his hope to reach an agreement with the other seller. Therefore, since the switching cost b is positive, the obstinate buyer will switch his partner just once and thus leaves a store when he is convinced that his opponent is also obstinate.
does not alter the main message of the paper. That is, multiple, non-Walrasian prices can be supported in equilibrium.
The case with "more strategic" obstinate buyer: In this and the next sections, I show that the main message of the paper (of Sections 4 and 5) will not change if the obstinate buyer is "more strategic" in the sense that he commits to immediately switch or leave his bargaining partner in case his demand is not accepted. Therefore, I suppose now that the obstinate buyer (of any demand) leaves the first store he visits at time
The next result shows that any α s ∈ C with 0 < α s is an equilibrium price for the sellers if the buyer is weak in equilibrium. The equilibrium strategies are as follows. In stage 1, rational sellers post the same demand α s , the rational buyer visits each seller with equal probabilities and declares his demand as α b < α s according to µ
.
At the beginning of stage 2, assuming that the buyer visits seller 1 first, the rational buyer immediately accepts seller 1's demand at time zero with probability P b = holds for all α b ∈ C with α b < α s .
I defer all the proofs in this section to Appendix. Thus, if z b and z s are sufficiently small and selected carefully, then all prices in the set C can be supported in equilibrium as proved in Section 4.
The case with the "most strategic" obstinate buyer: Now suppose that the obstinate buyer (of any demand) leaves all stores immediately following his arrival. The following strategies ensure that all demands in the set C can be supported as equilibrium
for small values of z b and z s . Rational sellers post the price of 0 < α s ∈ C and the rational buyer visits each seller with equal probabilities and declares his demand as α b < α s according to µ * that is given above. At the beginning of stage 2, assuming that the buyer visits seller 1 first, the rational buyer immediately accepts seller 1's demand at time zero with probability P b =
and immediately leaves store 1 with probability 1 − P b .
Rational seller 1 never concedes to the buyer. In store 2, rational seller 2 accepts the buyer's demand upon his arrival with probability P s =
(1−αs)(1−δ) δ(1−zs)(αs−α b ) and never concedes to the buyer with probability 1−P s . 43 The rational buyer does not leave store 2 immediately.
Instead he waits for the seller's concession. However, if the game does not end at time zero by seller 2's concession, the rational buyer concedes to the buyer immediately.
Proposition 7.2 . Suppose that the obstinate buyer leaves both stores immediately following his arrival. Take any z b and z s small enough. Then, α s ∈ C \ {0} is an equilibrium demand selection of the rational sellers in the first stage of the competitive-bargaining
holds for all α b ∈ C with α b < α s .
Different Initial Reputations for the Sellers
Suppose for now that the sellers' initial reputations are different, i.e. z 1 = z 2 . This assumption would not change the essence of our results as long as z 1 and z 2 are small enough. In equilibrium, rational sellers will not post different prices because the intuition of Proposition 4.1 will still survive. Similar to Proposition 4.3, in equilibrium, rational sellers post the same price α s if and only if the buyer is weak, which would mean
As the rational buyer is weak, his expected payoff is independent of the seller's initial reputations, and so this particular heterogeneity does not change the fundamentals of the competition between the sellers.
Sequential Price Quoting
Suppose now that the price announcement in the game G is sequential. Seller 1 announces its demand first. Then, the second seller posts its price after observing the first seller's announcement. Finally, the buyer declares his demand after observing the sellers' prices and the rest of the game follows as it was before. Note that, this change in the first stage does not alter the equilibrium strategies of the players in the concession game, and so they are the same as those characterized in Section 3.
Similar to the previous arguments, in equilibrium, the sellers will not post different prices. Moreover, if the buyer is strong, then the unique equilibrium price will be 0.
These conclusions hold because the arguments in the proof of Proposition 4.1 and 4.3 do not depend on the sellers' timing in stage 1. On the other hand, when the buyer is weak, that is z b ≤ (z s /A) λ b /λs , then the rational sellers' expected payoff in the game increases with the price they post if z b and z s are sufficiently small. 44 Hence, in equilibrium, both sellers will post the same price which will be the highest price available in the set C. As a result, when all the frictions vanish, the unique equilibrium price will converge to 
The Discrete-Time Model and Convergence
In this section, I consider the competitive-bargaining game in discrete time and investigate the structure of its equilibria as players can make their offers increasingly frequent.
I show that given the symmetric obstinate types, the second stage equilibrium outcomes of the competitive-bargaining game in discrete-time converge to a unique limit, independent of the exogenously given bargaining protocols, as time between offers approach to zero, and this limit is equivalent to the unique outcome of the continuous-time game investigated in Section 3.
To be more specific, I suppose that each player has a single commitment type. In stage 1, first the sellers and then the buyer announces their types α s ∈ (0, 1) and α b ∈ (0, 1) respectively where α b < α s . Then the buyer chooses a store to visit first. Upon the buyer's arrival at store i, beginning of stage 2, the buyer and seller i bargain in discrete time according to some protocol g i that generalizes Rubinstein's alternating offers protocol. A bargaining protocol g i between the buyer and seller i is defined as
such that for any time t ≥ 0, an offer is made by the buyer if g i (t) = 1 and by seller i if
45 Moreover, g i (t) = 3 implies a simultaneous offer whereas g i (t) = 0 means no offer is made at time t. An infinite horizon bargaining protocol is denoted by g = (g 1 , g 2 ).
The bargaining protocol g is discrete. That is, for any seller i and for allt ≥ 0, the set
, 2, 3}} is countable. Notice that this definition for a bargaining protocol is very general and accommodates non-stationary, non-alternating protocols.
In stage 2, the rational players are free to choose any offer from the set (0, 1). An offer x ∈ (0, 1) denotes the share the seller is to receive. If the proposer's opponent accepts his offer, the game ends with agreement x where xe −trs denotes the payoff to seller i, 0 is the payoff to seller j and finally (1 − x)e −tr b is the payoff to the buyer. If the proposer's opponent rejects his offer, the game continues. Prior to the next offer, the rational buyer decides whether to stay or leave the store. If the rational buyer decides to stay, the next offer is made at time t := min{t > t|t ∈ I i }, for example, by the buyer if g i (t ) = 1. The two-stage competitive-bargaining game in discrete-time is denoted by G g, (z n , r n ) n∈{b,s} (or G(g) in short). The competitive-bargaining game G(g) ends if the offers are compatible. In the event of strict compatibility the surplus is split equally.
Throughout the game, both sellers can perfectly observe the buyer's moves. Thus, the players' actual types remain to be the only source of uncertainty.
I am particularly interested in equilibrium outcome(s) of the competitive-bargaining game G(g) in the limit where the players can make sufficiently frequent offers. Therefore, for > 0 small enough, let G(g ) denote discrete-time competitive-bargaining game where the buyer and the sellers bargain, in stage two, according to the protocol g = (g 1 , g 2 )
such that for all t ≥ 0 and i, both seller i and the buyer have the chance to make an offer, at least once, within the interval [t, t + ] in the bargaining protocol g i . 46 In this sense, the discrete-time competitive-bargaining game G(g ) converges to continuous time as → 0.
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Now, let σ denote a sequential equilibrium of the discrete-time competitive-bargaining game G(g ) and σ i be the rational buyer's equilibrium strategy for store selection at time zero. Given σ i , the random outcome corresponding to σ is a random object θ (σ i ) which denotes any realization of an agreed division as well as a time and store at which agreement is reached.
The next result shows that in the limit as converges to zero θ (σ i ) → θ(σ i ) in distribution, where θ(σ i ) is the unique equilibrium distribution of the continuous-time game G.
Therefore, the outcome of the discrete-time competitive-bargaining game, independent of the bargaining protocol g , converge in distribution to the unique (given the buyers initial choice of store) equilibrium outcome of the competitive-bargaining game analyzed in Section 3-A.
Proposition 8.1. As converges to 0, θ (σ i ) converges in distribution to θ(σ i ).
I defer the proof to the Online Appendix. 
denote the expected payoff of rational seller i who concedes at time t ≥ T i and
denote the expected payoff of the rational buyer who concedes to seller i at time t ≥ T i .
Therefore, the utility functions are also continuous on
Then, it follows that D i, 
Moreover, by Lemma A.3, we know that if the buyer is strong in a concession game with seller i (starting at time T i ), then seller i is weak. Hence, there is no sequential equilibrium of the game G such that the buyer visits a store multiple times. Suppose on the contrary that there is a strategy in which, without loss of generality, the buyer visits store 1 twice. Then, the buyer must be strong in his second visit to seller 1. Otherwise the buyer would prefer to concede to seller 2 and finish the game before making the second visit to store 1 (because δ < 1). Thus, since seller 1 is weak, his expected payoff is α b when the buyer visits his store for the second time. However, in equilibrium, this continuation payoff contradicts the optimality of seller 1's strategy because seller 1 would prefer to accept the buyer's offer (for sure) when the buyer first attempts to leave his store to eliminate a further delay.
As a result, in equilibrium, rational sellers will not allow the buyer to leave their stores. On the other hand, the rational buyer will eventually leave the first store he visits if that seller is obstinate. The reason for this is clear. Since the players' concession game strategies are increasing and continuous, the seller's reputation will eventually converge to one at some finite time.
The rational buyer has no incentive to continue the concession game with an obstinate seller, and so he must either concede to the seller at that time or leave the store. However, Lemma A.2 implies that concession game strategies must be continuous in their domain, eliminating the possibility of mass acceptance at the time that the seller's reputation reaches one.
Next, for notational simplicity, I reset the clock each time the buyer arrives at a store, and denote the buyer's concession game strategy against seller i by Finally, Lemma A.3 implies that F 1 b (0)F 1 (0) = 0. Since seller 2's reputation reaches 1 at time T e 2 , then the rational buyer will not continue the game G after this time. Thus, his reputation must also reach 1 at that time, implying that
is the buyer's reputation at the time he arrives at store 2 andẑ
is the buyer's reputation at the time he arrives at store 1.
Proof of Lemma 3.1 . Consider an equilibrium where the rational buyer visits seller 1 first with probability
. Therefore, the rational buyer (weakly) prefers to go to store 2 over conceding seller 1. In equilibrium, rational seller 1 anticipates that the buyer will never concede to him, and hence accepts α b at time zero without any delay. Therefore, if 1 is rational the game is over at time zero. Otherwise, the buyer leaves the first store at time zero and directly goes to 2. Therefore, the concession game in store 2 ends at time
log zs λs denote the times that the buyer's and seller 2's reputations reach 1, respectively. Given the equilibrium strategies by Proposition 3.1, the rest follows.
Proof of Lemma 3.2 . Consider an equilibrium where the rational buyer visits seller 1 first with probability
Then, the rational buyer prefers to play the concession game with seller 1 over going to store 2 at time zero. Since the buyer leaves store 1 if and only if seller 1 is obstinate, seller 1's reputation reaches one at time
log zs λs denote the times that the buyer's and seller 1's reputations reach 1, respectively.
However, leaving 1 is optimal for the rational buyer if and only if the buyer's reputation at
Given the value of T d 1 , solving the last equality yields the buyer's equilibrium strategy in store 1. Finally, the game ends in store 2 at time T 
However, the last equality is possible only if
The last inequality yields the desired contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3.4 . First note that there is no equilibrium in which the buyer visits store 1 multiple times and store 2 more than twice. Second, since we have 1−α 1 < δ(1−α 2 ), the rational buyer prefers going to store 2 over conceding to seller 1 at any given time. That is, in equilibrium, the rational buyer never concedes to seller 1. Since rational seller 1 anticipates that the rational buyer will never accept his demand in equilibrium, he concedes to the buyer with probability one upon his arrival without any delay. Thus, the buyer leaves seller 1 immediately if rational seller 1 does not accept the buyer's demand and finish the game at time zero.
If the buyer arrives at store 2 (after visiting seller 1), then the rational buyer and seller 2 play the concession game until some finite time T e 2 as the buyer has no outside option worth leaving store 2. As characterized in the proof of Proposition 3.1, the equilibrium strategies are . Therefore, the game in store 2 ends at time T e 2 = min{τ 2 b , τ 2 } for sure if it does not end before, where
, denoting the times that the buyer's and seller 2's reputations reach 1 respectively.
To prove the second part of the proposition, suppose that the buyer visits seller 2 first at time 0. If the rational buyer concedes to seller 2, his instantaneous payoff is 1 − α 2 . However, if the rational buyer leaves store 2 at time zero and goes to store 1, then we know from previous arguments that rational seller 1 will immediately accept the buyer's demand. Therefore, the rational buyer's continuation payoff of leaving store 2 at time 0
denoting the buyer's expected payoff in his second visit to store 2. In equilibrium v 2 b must be equal to 1 − α 2 . Suppose for a contradiction that v 2 b > 1 − α 2 . It requires that seller 2 offers positive probabilistic gift to the buyer on his second visit. In this case, seller 2's expected payoff must be α b (as F 2 b (0)F 2 (0) = 0 by Lemma A.3). However, optimality of the equilibrium strategy implies that rational seller 2 should have accepted the buyer's offer with probability 1 when the buyer attempts to leave his store for the first time. Hence, it must be that in equilibrium v 2 b = 1 − α 2 . As a result, the rational buyer's expected payoff if he leaves store 2 at time 0
Finally, ifV b is larger than 1−α 2 , then the rational buyer prefers leaving store 2 immediately Proof of Proposition 3.5 . The rational buyer's expected payoff of visiting store 2 first,
. In equilibrium, it must be true that
If σ 1 is such that the buyer is weak in store 2, then the last equality implies that
. However, this equality cannot be true when z s is small and δ is close enough to 1. Hence, in equilibrium, the rational buyer must pick σ 1 in such a way that he becomes strong relative to seller 2 when he visits store 1 first. Thus,
implies the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 4.3 . Given that both sellers choose α s , the equilibrium strategies of the rational buyer in the first stage, σ i and µ must satisfy the followings.
1. σ i is the probability of visiting seller i first with σ 1 + σ 2 = 1 and µ is a probability distribution over the set D ⊂ C αs = {α b ∈ C|α b ≤ α s } with x∈D µ(x) = 1.
2. For all i ∈ {1, 2} and α b ∈ D we must have
. This payoff function is implied by Lemmas 3.1-3.3.
3. V ≥ 1 − min{C \ D}. That is, the rational buyer should have no incentive to deviate and declare some other demand α b which is not in the support of µ. Hence, together with the second stage strategies given in Section 3, µ * and σ i are the rational buyer's equilibrium strategies.
Finally, given that the rational players' second stage strategies are as characterized in section 3, I will show that posting the demand α s at time zero is an optimal strategy for a seller if the other seller also posts α s . For this reason, I will first calculate each sellers expected payoff under the strategies µ * and σ i that are given above. Let V i denote seller i's expected payoff in the game. Since a deviating seller's equilibrium payoff is less than (z b + z s ) (by Corollary 3.1), I will argue that price undercutting is not optimal if we choose z b and z s sufficiently small. Moreover, following the assumptions on obstinate types, if a seller deviates and posts a price above α s , then his expected payoff in the game will be simply zero. Thus, V i = pα s + ( Case 4. The buyer picks store i second and he is either rational or obstinate of type α b < α s .
Probability to this event is Note that V i is strictly greater than ( 1 2 − p)u where u is the convex combination of the demands in C αs \ {α s }, i.e., u = α b <αs α b µ(α b ), and it is much higher than (z b + z s ) if z b and z s are sufficiently small. Hence, posting α s is optimal for each seller. This completes the proof of the only if part. That is, α s is an equilibrium price selection of the rational sellers in stage 1.
Next, I will prove the if part. For this purpose, I assume that 0 < α s ∈ C is an equilibrium demand of the game G(z b , z s ). Suppose for a contradiction that there exists some α * b < α s such that z b > (z 2 s /A) λ * b /λ * . Consider any first stage equilibrium strategies of the rational buyer µ and σ i . I will reach a contradiction in two steps. First, I want to show that if there is such α * b , then the rational buyer's expected payoff in the game must be strictly higher than 1 − α s (which is the least the rational buyer can achieve in an equilibrium where both sellers post the price of α s ).
To prove the last claim, assume for a contradiction that the buyer's expected payoff under the strategies µ and σ i is 1 − α s . That is, for each i,
x<αs π(x) for all α b < α s and σ i = 1/2 ensures thatẑ i b = z b when the buyer announces α * b , implying that the buyer is strong if he announces α * b in the first stage. This means that the rational buyer's expected payoff in the game is strictly higher than 1 − α s under µ and σ i ; the rational buyer's expected payoff is strictly higher than 1 − α s if he announces α * b and is equal to 1 − α s for all other demands other than α * b . This contradicts to the earlier assumption that µ and σ i are equilibrium strategies for the rational buyer.
Hence, the buyer's expected payoff under equilibrium must be strictly higher than 1 − α s conditional on there is such a demand α * b . However, since µ is a mixed strategy, then the buyer's expected payoff for all realizations of demands α b < α s must be strictly higher than 1−α s . But, this is impossible when α b = 0 as Proposition 3.3 shows, leading to the desired contradiction. The rational buyer leaves seller 2 when his discounted continuation payoff in store 3, i.e.
As a result, the buyer's expected payoff in store 2 at the time he enters this store
Similarly, the buyer leaves seller 1 when his discounted continuation payoff in store 2, i.e. δv 2 b , equals to 1 − α s . Then we haveẑ
, The first term in the numerator corresponds to the probability that the obstinate buyer with demand α b is visiting seller i first and arriving at the market in a short period dt. Likewise, the second term denotes the probability that the obstinate buyer visits seller i second, implying that the buyer should have arrived at the market − log(z s )/λ s + ∆ units of time ago during the short period dt. 48 Given the strategies of the players, if the buyer arrives at the market at the period 0+dt, then the obstinate buyer's arrival time at the second store isT = −log(z s )/λ s + ∆ + dt. Therefore, the second term in the numerator does not exists if T <T . Moreover, the limiting case where dt approaches zero implies thatẑ } (this directly follows from Abreu and Gul (2000), Proposition 1.) As a result, the buyer's expected payoff in each store is 1 − α s because independent of the buyer's arrival time at either store, the buyer will be weak in both.
Hence, visiting each seller with equal probabilities is an optimal strategy for the rational buyer.
Furthermore, if the rational buyer leaves his current bargaining partner at any point of time and goes to the other seller, then his continuation payoff will be δ(1 − α s ). Hence, not leaving a seller's store and playing the concession game until the time − log(z s )/λ s are also optimal strategies.
Third, independent of α b (≤ α s ), the rational buyer's expected payoff is 1 − α s in each store.
Thus, the mixed strategy µ T αs (α b ) = π(α b ) x<αs π(x) is an optimal strategy for the rational buyer. Finally, I will show that posting the demand α s at time zero is an optimal strategy for a seller if the other seller also posts α s . For this person, I will first calculate each seller's expected payoff under the strategies given in the main text. Let V i (T ) denote seller i's expected payoff in the game (evaluated in time T ) given that the buyer arrives at the market at time T ≥ 0.
Then, I calculate a deviating seller's equilibrium payoff (again evaluated in time T assuming 48 Recall that −log(z s )/λ s is the length of the concession game in the stores where λ s = Probability to this event is p and i's expected payoff is 0.
Case 3. The buyer picks store i first and he is either rational or the obstinate type with demand α b < α s . Probability to this event is Case 4. The remaining case is that the buyer picks store j first and he is either rational or the obstinate type with demand α b < α s . Probability to this event is Proof of Proposition 7.1. I will show that the strategies given in the main text constitute and equilibrium. Suppose that the rational buyer announces α b < α s in stage 1 and consider the second stage. First, at time zero, the rational buyer and seller 1 has two options; accept and reject. Rejection for the buyer means leaving the store. I assume that if the buyer chooses to leave but the seller accepts, then the game will end with the seller's acceptance. If the rational buyer does not leave the first store at time zero, he reveals his rationality, in which case the buyer's expected payoff will be no more than 1−α s (since the buyer is discounting time). Hence, in equilibrium, the rational buyer will either concede or leave the store at time zero.
Second, if the rational buyer finishes the game in store 1 with probability P b , then the buyer's reputation conditional on him arriving store 2 after visiting 1 is (z s /A) λ b /λs as calculated by , we have V i (accept) < V i (reject).
Hence, P s = 0 is a best response as well.
Finally, I will show that posting the demand α s at time zero is an optimal strategy for a Case 5. The buyer picks store i second and he is rational. Probability to this event is (1 − z s ) 1 2 and rational seller i's expected payoff in this case is (1 − P b )e −rs∆ α s .
Note that for small values of z b and z s , the value of V i is greater than (z b + z s ) which concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7.2. Similar arguments in the proof of Proposition 7.1 will prove our claim. Note that given the value of P b , as in the main text, the buyer's reputation conditional on him announcing α b and arriving store 2 after visiting store 1 is z * b = 1 − α b
αs . The value of z * b makes rational seller 2 indifferent between immediate concession, with payoff of α b , and rejection with payoff of (1 − z * b )α s . Since rational seller 2 is indifferent, immediate concession with probability P s (as given in the main text) is optimal. Moreover, P s ensures the expected payoff of 
